In a decision of 18 July 2018, the Paris Court of Appeal recalls the pickets and the consequences of the breach of the commercial agency contract. Its solution is worth reporting because it provides an overview of the fundamental issues in this area. After the recall of the (…) There are three types of financial or commercial risks essential to the definition of an agency agreement for the purposes of Article 101, paragraph 1. First, there are contract-specific risks that are directly related to contracts entered into and/or negotiated by the representative on behalf of the client, such as equity financing.B. Second, there are the risks associated with market-related investments. These are investments that are necessary specifically for the type of activity for which the contracting authority has appointed the agent, that is, which are necessary to enable the agent to enter into and/or negotiate this type of contract. Such investments are usually sewn, which means that the investment cannot be used or sold for other activities, except with a significant loss, after leaving this field of activity. Third, there are the risks associated with other activities in the same product market, to the extent that the contracting entity requires the agent to engage in such activities, not as an agent on behalf of the client, but for his or her own risk. Discussions on agency agreements have long focused on the distinction between “real” and “non-true” and who bears the risks between the client and the agent. Given that the literature on this distinction is widespread, the current article will focus on providing an overview of recent cases in which award-winning entities and/or agents have been held responsible for anti-competitive behaviour under Section 101, paragraphs 1 or 102, of the R and; D, especially when agreements facilitate agreements or price controls. In such cases, the entity`s liability for the conduct of its agent is particularly at stake. A: Exclusive distribution agreements such as these are generally allowed.
Although the retailer is prevented from selling competing flat screens, this may be the type of product that requires a certain level of knowledge and service to sell. For example, if the manufacturer invests in training the distributor`s sales staff in the operation and characteristics of the product, it may reasonably require the distributor to agree to sell only its brand of monitors. This level of service benefits buyers of sophisticated electronic products. As long as there are enough opportunities for consumers to buy their products elsewhere, antitrust laws are unlikely to encroach on these types of exclusive agreements. In this case, it is essential that the contractor designated as a commercial agent is effectively such because of his activity and that he must not engage in activities specific to an independent economic operator in the course of commercial activity.